Paillot v. Wooton: Determining the Complexity of Predeprivation Hearings Required by Procedural Due Process by Craighead, M. Shane
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 51 | Number 4
March 1991
Paillot v. Wooton: Determining the Complexity of
Predeprivation Hearings Required by Procedural
Due Process
M. Shane Craighead
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
M. Shane Craighead, Paillot v. Wooton: Determining the Complexity of Predeprivation Hearings Required by Procedural Due Process, 51 La.
L. Rev. (1991)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol51/iss4/11
Paillot v. Wooton: Determining the Complexity of
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INTRODUCTION
Paillot v. Wooton' challenged on procedural due process grounds
two parish ordinances that allowed the parish president and the sheriff
to suspend or revoke liquor permits and liquor licenses without prior
notice or a hearing.2 The case arose after allegations that the plaintiff
bar-owner allowed minors inside her bar, sponsored a "Drink Until You
Copyright 1991, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. 559 So. 2d 758 (La. 1990).
2. Plaquemines Parish Ordinance § 4-14(d) (1960):
If any disturbance of the peace, public nuisance or other violation of State
Law or of this Chapter is committed on said premises, the President of the
Council with the approval of the Commissioner of Finance or the Sheriff, is
hereby authorized to suspend or revoke said permit, and such violation shall
be cause for the Council to refuse to grant other Parish permits to the same
applicant or for the conduct of such business on the same premises. In case
of such suspension or revocation, permittee may appeal to the council for a
hearing, to remove or recall the suspension or revocation, pending which hearing
no liquor or beer shall be sold by permittee under the penalties provided by
this chapter. No appeal shall lie to the courts, nor shall the courts have or
take jurisdiction of any appeal from such suspension or revocation, unless
permittee has exhausted his administrative remedy of appeal to the council in
the event of an adverse decision.
Plaquemines Parish Ordinance § 14-26 (1960):
Suspension or revocation of license
If any part of a licensed premises is used for prostitution or the soliciting
thereof, or is frequented by prostitutes, or is used for concealing or storing
narcotics or stolen property, or if any violation of Louisiana Law or Parish
Ordinance is committed on said premises, The Council, through its President,
with recommendation from the Director of Administration or the Sheriff, may
suspend or revoke the Occupation License to continue to conduct such business
and the Parish fiscal officers shall reimburse the license for the balance of the
year's license tax from such date of suspension or revocation.
In case of suspension or revocation of said license, the licensee may appeal
to the Council for a hearing to recall and set aside said suspensions or revocation,
pending which no business operations shall be conducted by said licensee.
Penalties for conducting business in violation of this section are provided in
Section 14-30. In the event of an adverse decision, no appeal shall lie to the
courts, nor shall the courts take jurisdiction of any appeal from such suspension
or revocation, unless the licensee has exhausted his administrative remedy of
appeal to the Council.
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Drop" special, and allowed a drunken couple, one of whom was a
minor, to drive from the bar, resulting in a fatal traffic accident. The
two officials suspended plaintiff's licenses pending hearing at the next
police jury meeting, scheduled for six days later. Plaintiff filed suit
seeking an injunction against the suspension on procedural due process
grounds.3 The district court found the ordinances unconstitutional. The
Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed, declaring that the two ordinances
violated procedural due process standards.
Prior decisions support the result reached in Paillot. The supreme
court concluded that the ordinances at issue unconstitutionally authorized
the government official to suspend the licenses when he believed there
to be a "public nuisance ' 4 or violation of "even minor state or parish
laws."'
Yet Paillot raises and leaves unresolved an important question for
citizens, government officials, and their attorneys: once it is determined
that process is due, how can one decide how much process is due? The
ongoing problem of determining the kind of hearing required is the
primary focus of most recent jurisprudence in the area of procedural
due process.6 By analyzing the Paillot case, this note suggests a reasonable
method of determining what type of hearings are required by due process
in various situations.
First, this note analyzes the Paillot opinion and the jurisprudence
upon which it relied. Next, it lists and explains various components of
due process, including those addressed in the opinion. 7 Finally, it suggests
an approach for the lawyer or administrator to use in determining how
much of a hearing due process requires.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: THE TREND
The Court's Analysis
The Louisiana constitution requires that "[n]o person shall be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property, except by due process of law." ' The
United States Constitution contains a like provision.9 A person threatened
3. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3; La. Const. art. I, § 2.
4. Plaquemines Parish Ordinance § 4-14(d) (1960).
5. Paillot v. Wooton, 559 So. 2d 758, 760 (La. 1990).
6. K. Davis, Administrative Law of the Eighties, § 13:1-I (Supp. 1989) [hereinafter
Davis Supplement].
7. While some cases cited in this note will deal with deprivations of "liberty," most
will concern deprivations of "property" interests. This note intentionally avoids procedural
due process in the criminal justice realm.
8. La. Const. art. I, § 2.
9. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3: "[N~or shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...."
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with deprivation of such an interest is entitled to an opportunity to
have some kind of process prior to the governmental action, absent
extraordinary circumstances.' 0 "What is required is a procedure, not
necessarily a hearing."" Fairness is the "essential guarantee" of the due
process clause." The due process analyses the Louisiana and United
States Supreme Courts employ are substantially the same, although the
results differ.'3
Paillot's due process analysis is a three part inquiry:' "(1) whether
the interest is or is not protected by due process, (2) if it is, whether
due process requires some kind of hearing, and (3) if it does, what
kind of hearing is required[?]"' 5 The Louisiana Supreme Court gave
definite answers to the first two questions, but left open the third.
In answer to the first question, the court determined that the sus-
pension of plaintiff's license was a deprivation requiring due process
protection. The court cited Fuentes v. Shevin,' 6 which involved the seizure
of property to satisfy a judgment. Fuentes took a broad view of the
scope of protected interests, stating that the due process clause "has
been read broadly to extend protection to 'any significant property
interest,' . . . including statutory entitlements."' 7 In Paillot, the parish
officials claimed not to have subjected the plaintiff to a deprivation of
a protected interest when they had only suspended plaintiff's licenses.
The court, in answer, stated that "[elven a temporary, nonfinal dep-
rivation of property is nonetheless a 'deprivation' within the contem-
plation of the Fourteenth Amendment."'"
The court answered the second question, whether due process requires
some kind of hearing, in the affirmative.' 9 Indeed, the court's affirmative
answer to question one almost forced an affirmative answer to question
10. See infra text accompanying notes 24-36.
11, Wilson v. City of New Orleans, 479 So. 2d 891, 895 (La. 1985).
12. J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Constitutional Law, § 13.8, at 487 (1986).
13. See In re Adoption of B.G.S., 556 So. 2d 545, 552 (La. 1990), where the Louisiana
Supreme Court stated that "[in interpreting our own state constitution... we are not
bound by this [federal] balancing approach .... Nevertheless, we have employed this
balancing test in deciding what procedure is due under the state due process clause, ...
and we will continue to do so as long as its application promotes the goals of that
safeguard."
14. Davis Supplement, supra note 6, § 13:1-1, at 341.
15. Paillot v. Wooton, 559 So. 2d 758, 760 (La. 1990) (citing Davis Syupplement,
supra note 6).
16. 407 U.S. 67, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972).
17. Id. at 86, 92 S. Ct. at 1997 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379,
91 S. Ct. 780, 786 (1971)).
18. Paillot, 559 So. 2d at 760.
19. Id.
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two.20 In deciding that the deprivation in Paillot did require some kind
of prior hearing, the court relied heavily on Goss v. Lopez" and Wilson
v. City of New Orleans.Y In Goss, the United States Supreme Court
concluded that high school students facing a ten-day suspension are
entitled to some notice of the reasons for the action and an opportunity
to tell their view of the incident before being suspended. In Wilson,
the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that individuals must receive
notice and some opportunity to respond before their vehicles may be
immobilized by a tire-booting service. The loss, even if only temporary,
of one's business is obviously more extreme than the loss in either Goss
or Wilson. The reasoning and results of Goss and Wilson suggest that
the loss in Paillot surely merited at least equivalent procedures. 2
One should not overlook the importance of the requirement that
the hearing be held prior to the deprivation. In effect, the government
did extend due process to the plaintiff in Paillot, but only after the
governmental deprivation. As noted above, the government claimed that
because the licenses were only suspended, the council could constitu-
tionally hold the hearing afterwards. 2 ' As earlier noted, the fatal flaw
of this reasoning is that it fails to recognize that even a temporary
deprivation is, nevertheless, a deprivation.25 Both state and federal courts
have recognized that post-deprivation hearings will be found constitu-
tional only in extraordinary circumstances. 26 As to what those extraor-
dinary circumstances may be, the Paillot court stated "[w]e [do not]
address what emergency situations would be adequate to justify such
dispensation since the question is not before us." 27 The United States
20. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-8, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2975 (1974)
(requiring "some kind of hearing" before a person can be deprived of his property and
liberty interests).
21. 419 U.S. 565, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975).
22. 479 So. 2d 891 (La. 1985).
23. Cf. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S. Ct. 2701
(1972), where the Supreme Court held that a college professor employed under a one
year contract had no property interest in the employment after the period specified in
the contract had expired.
24. Paillot v. Wooton, 559 So. 2d 758, 760 (La. 1990).
25. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337, 89 S. Ct. 1820
(1969).
26. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S. Ct. 729, 740 (1975); Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379, 91 S. Ct. 781, 786 (1971); Paillot, 559 So. 2d at 760;
In re Adoption of B.G.S., 556 So. 2d 545, 552 (La. 1990).
27. Paillot, 559 So. 2d at 762 n.4. This statement seems to illustrate a welcome
departure from the broad dicta interpreting La. Const. art. I, § 2 in Bell v. Dept. of
Health and Human Resources, 483 So. 2d 945, 951 (La. 1986), which stated "[There
seems to be an emerging concept that in some instances due process is fulfilled by a
'post-deprivation' hearing .... We believe that this view to procedural due process in
certain situations is sound .... (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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Supreme Court had held subsequent hearings constitutional in cases
involving mining regulations, 2 driver's license suspensions upon reftial
to undergo a breath test,2 9 exclusions from military bases for "security
reasons,"" misbranded articles in commerce,3' prevention of bank fail-
ures,32 governmental price-fixing during war time,33 collections of taxes
pending result of appeal, 3' seizure during war time of property allegedly
belonging to the enemy," and the seizure of contaminated food.3 How-
ever, more recent federal jurisprudence has indicated that the courts will
apply a very narrow interpretation of this "extraordinary circumstances"
exception.
The third question, what kind of hearing was required, was raised,
discussed, and left unanswered by Paillot. For the purpose of this note,
this was the most critical question. The primary case cited by the court
in its discussion of the type of hearing required was Mathews v. Eld-
ridge.3" Mathews stated:
[Ildentification of the specific dictates of due process generally
requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private
interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional
or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Govern-
ment's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute pro-
cedural requirement would entail.3 9
The court used this balancing approach to determine that the government
denied plaintiff's constitutional right to a prior hearing. The Paillot
court stated: "IT]he benefits of reducing the chance for error and of
bolstering the impression that government is operating fairly outweigh
the insignificant costs to government of providing a summary of evidence
28. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264,
101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981).
29. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2612 (1979).
30. Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,
81 S. Ct. 1743 (1%1).
31. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594, 70 S. Ct. 870 (1950).
32. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 67 S. Ct. 1552 (1947).
33. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 64 S. Ct. 660 (1944).
34. Phillips v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 283 U.S. 589, 51 S. Ct. 608 (1931).
35. Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554, 41 S. Ct. 214 (1921).
36. North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 29 S. Ct. 101
(1908).
37. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975); Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 94 S. Ct. 2963 (1974).
38. 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976).
39. Id. at 335, 96 S. Ct. at 903.
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and receiving an informal written or oral response." 4 The language
above suggests an informal hearing would have satisfied due process,
but the decision also cited Louisiana State Bar Association v. Ehmig,4 1
which concluded that, before an attorney may be disbarred, he must
"be heard at a formal hearing. "42 While the plaintiff in Paillot was not
involved in a "profession," the bar was most likely the basis of her
livelihood.4 The Goss and Wilson cases, cited earlier by the court, also
contained applications of this balancing approach. The hearing required
by Goss (student suspensions) was very informal, and the notice could
come at the time of the hearing." The court limited the procedure in
Wilson (tire-booting) to allow the owner "to question only whether the
criteria for booting his vehicle have been met."'45 In the Paillot scenario,
how much process was due? The cases cited by the court and the diverse
results reached in those cases, combined with the court's decision not
to set forth a hearing process, indicate that the question of how much
process is due must be answered on an ad hoc basis. 46
How Much Procedural Protection Must a "Hearing" Allow to
Satisfy Procedural Due Process?
Throughout most of the twentieth century, lawyers assumed that
the most effective mode of fact-finding was through trial procedure. 47
The extent of procedure required was decided in a categorical fashion-
40. Paillot v. Wooton, 559 So. 2d 758, 762 (La. 1990). The court adopts an additional
factor set forth by Professor Davis-citizens' perceived fairness of governmental actions.
See 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 13:12, at 510-11 (1979). He states that
"[e]ven if the accuracy of the written process were found to be equal to the accuracy
of the evidentiary hearing, due process could require the hearing on the ground that
government must keep citizens satisfied that governmental processes are fair, not arbitrary."
Id. at 511 (emphasis added).
41. 277 So. 2d 137 (La. 1973).
42. Id. at 140.
43. Plaintiff was accused of being an interposed party on the licenses, and not actually
operating the bar. Brief for Applicant, at 3, Paillot v. Wooton, 559 So. 2d 758 (La.
1990) (No. 89-CC-2685).
44. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581-2, 95 S. Ct. 729, 740 (1975).
45. Wilson v. City of New Orleans, 479 So. 2d 891, 903 (La. 1985).
46. As a practical matter, governing agencies or bodies would probably better preserve
the sanctions (deprivations) they wish to implement by promulgating, in the same pro-
visions, procedures which, at least in theory, protect the individual facing the sanction
(deprivation). For example, the type of hearing required by La. State Bar Ass'n v. Ehmig,
277 So. 2d 137, 140 (La. 1973), was promulgated in the Articles of Incorporation of the
La. State Bar Ass'n as La. R.S. 37, ch. 4 app., art. XV, §§ 1-6 (1988). Such procedures,
if provided, would at least impress a reviewing court that the governing officials considered
the appropriate factors in an attempt to satisfy due process.
47. 2 K. Davis, supra note 40, § 12:2, at 410.
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a full trial-type hearing or no process at all.4 This method, however,
was usually limited to factual issues. 49 Those cases which did not merit
this type of hearing were considered de minimis. In this way, if
adjudicative facts were to be determined, a full adversary hearing would
usually be required. This all-or-nothing approach was criticized by scho-
lars. The increase in governmental interaction with citizens has forced
at least some adjudicative facts to be determined in hearings granting
less than full adversarial protections.5 Since 1974, the courts have moved
away from the all-or-nothing approach.52 The very principle of Goss
indicates that fewer and fewer cases should be considered de minimus.
Today, the degree of minuteness of the interest at stake should be met
with a corresponding degree of informality of proceedings. The problem
for agency officials is determining what amount of due process is required
in a particular situation. What follows is a formula for determining that
amount.
The Problem: What Factors Are to be Balanced When Attempting to
Determine What Due Process Is?
As revealed in Paillot, the factors to be balanced when deciding
how much of a hearing due process requires are:
(1) The private interest affected by government action;
(2) The risk of error in the procedure used, and the probable
value of any modified procedure; and
(3) Perceived fairness by the citizen being deprived of a right;
balanced against:
(4) The governmental interest in taking the action; and
(5) The overall governmental burden of extending more pro-
cedural protections.53
48. Davis supplement, supra note 6, § 13:1-1, at 340. For a good example, see
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S. Ct. 1011 (1970), where the court held that before
A.F.D.C. benefits could be suspended (pending a full hearing later), ten requirements
normally present in a trial had to be extended to the individual. Those requirements
included oral presentation of argument and evidence, cross-examination, and the right to
retain an attorney.
49. 2 K. Davis, supra note 40, § 12:2, at 410.
50. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 577, 95 S. Ct. 729, 737 (1975).
51. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1268 (1975).
52. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976) (termination of
social security benefits); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975) (high school
student suspensions); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S. Ct. 2963 (1974) (parole
hearings); Wilson v. City of New Orleans, 479 So. 2d 891 (La. 1985) (tire-booting of
automobiles); Haughton Elevator Div. v. State Div. of Admin., 367 So. 2d 1161 (La.
1979) (public bid law).
53. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S. Ct. at 903; 2 K. Davis, supra note 40, § 13:12,
at 511.
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Protections Which May Be Offered
The outcome of this balance determines the necessity of extending
various procedural safeguards. An illustrative list of those procedures
is: (1) an unbiased tribunal, (2) notice of the proposed action and the
grounds asserted for it, (3) an opportunity to present reasons why the
proposed action should not be taken, (4) the right to call witnesses, (5)
the right to know the adverse evidence, (6) the right to have the decision
based only on the evidence presented, (7) the right to counsel, (8) a
written record, (9) a statement of reasons for the decision, (10) public
attendance, and (11) judicial review. 4
Application of the Method to the Paillot Case
Paillot illustrates the dilemma for agency officials in implementing
pre-deprivation procedures that satisfy procedural due process. Only after
litigation in the trial court and appeal to the supreme court was it
brought home to the officials in Paillot that reliance on an ordinance
providing for a deprivation of a property right, without more, is not
enough: the officials, the agency, and the lawmaking body itself must
take into account the due process clause whenever a deprivation is to
take place. Below is a description of the type of analysis that should
have preceded the actions of the officials in Paillot and which should
precede any deprivation action anticipated by any governmental agency
in Louisiana."
Weighing the Private Interest Against the State's
The private interest affected in Paillot was of obvious importance-
a person's livelihood. 6 In the area of property interests, one's livelihood
is considered among the weightiest. 7 The ordinances, as written and
applied, created a great risk of error inasmuch as it might be presumed
that liquor licensees derive their livelihood from the sale of alcohol. A
modified procedure would have been of great value. The ordinances
54.. Friendly, supra note 51, at 1279-95.
55. Justice Dennis applied this method of analysis in In re Adoption of B.G.S., 556
So. 2d 545, 554-5, 557 (La. 1990).
56. See La. State Bar Ass'n v. Ehmig, 277 So. 2d 137, 139 (La. 1973). However,
plaintiff was accused of being an interposed party on the licenses, and not actually relying
on the bar for her livelihood. See Brief for Applicant, at 3, Paillot v. Wooton, 559 So.
2d 758 (La. 1990) (No. 89-CC-2685).
57. See also Haughton Elevator Div. v. State Div. of Admin., 367 So. 2d 1161 (La.
1979) (involving disqualification of public bidder); and Note, Shaping Specific Procedural
Requirements for Disqualification under Louisiana's Public Bid Law, 40 La. L. Rev. 871
(1980). Cf. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S. Ct. 2701
(1972).
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authorized immediate action if any state or local crime was "commit-
ted.""8 The ordinances make no mention of conviction, probable cause,
or even reasonable suspicion. The officials' actions in reliance on the
ordinances offered no basis for their findings, nor any opportunity to
test the credibility of the witnesses. As a result of this arbitrary fact-
finding procedure, the deprivee probably would have perceived govern-
mental unfairness.
What "governmental interest," as a counterbalancing force, was at
stake in Paillot? There were several legitimate governmental interests,
i.e.: the parish's interest in ensuring that bar-owners observe the liquor
laws, particularly the ones prohibiting service to minors; and the parish's
interest in protecting the lives of its citizens from the activities which
allegedly resulted in two deaths. The parish council granted a full hearing
to the deprivee after the deprivation. The fact of this subsequent hearing
is certainly evidence that the "burden of providing a more complex
procedure" must not have been unreasonable. Why, then, was not a
hearing, possibly even of less formality than the subsequent hearing,
granted before the suspension? Since Paillot, it is clear that the agency
responsible for such a deprivation must provide procedures in advance
of the deprivation.
Unbiased Tribunal
A balancing of the above factors determines which of the various
procedural safeguards59 are necessary to ensure due process. The first
of these safeguards considered is the requirement of a neutral and
detached decision-maker. "The essential guarantee of the Due Process
Clause is fundamentally fair procedure .... Therefore, there must be
some type of neutral and detached decision maker, be it judge, hearing
officer or agency.'"'6 There is some debate over just how neutral a
decision-maker must be in order to comply with due process. 6' The
Louisiana Supreme Court seemingly has adopted a more exacting stan-
dard than have federal courts in judging neutrality.62 The dispute over
58. Plaquemines Parish Ordinances §§ 4-14 & 14-26 (1960).
59. See supra text accompanying note 40.
60. In re Adoption of B.G.S., 556 So. 2d 545, 555 (La. 1990).
61. See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 155, 94 S. Ct. 1633, 1645 n.21
(1974), where then Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the majority, rejected Justice White's
conclusion that the victim of alleged slanderous remarks should not serve as decision-
maker in the termination proceeding of the federal employee accused of making the
slanderous remarks. See Justice White, concurring in part and dissenting in part, id. at
1666.
62. See, e.g., Wilson v. City of New Orleans, 479 So. 2d 891, 901-2 (La. 1985),
where Justice Dennis stated that a situation involving an individual "occup[ying] two
inconsistent positions, one partisan and the other judicial, necessarily involves a lack of
due process." (emphasis added).
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the degree of neutrality is avoidable. An approach providing a direct
relationship between the degree of neutrality of the decision-maker and
the degree of informality of proceedings is more desirable. That is, a
predominantly neutral decision-maker would require fewer of the other
procedural protections, while a biased or interested decision-maker would
require more procedural formality.63 The parish president who suspended
the licenses was a member of the parish council which probably would
have served as the hearing body. At a minimum, the council probably
would have appeared to the plaintiff as being biased. Thus, more of
the various other safeguards would have been required than in a situation
involving a more detached fact-finding body.
Notice
Nothing in the Paillot decision indicates the deprivee received any
prior notice of the suspension. The government must give some notice
reasonably calculated to reach the interested party prior to deprivations
such as the one in Paillot." The notice must be by mail or other means
as certain, unless the deprivee's address is not reasonably ascertainable. 5
The Louisiana Supreme Court has declared the judicial sale of a legally
separated" spouse's community interest in a house without prior notice
to be unconstitutional. 7 The Goss case, which involved suspension of
public school students, however, indicates that due process may be
satisfied by notice at the time of the deprivation." A balancing of the
interests at stake in Paillot indicates that the notice required would more
closely resemble that in the former, rather than the latter example.
Right to Present a Case
The right of the individual to present reasons why the action should
not be taken "is fundamental. " 69 "Persons whose rights may be affected
63. Friendly, supra note 51, at 1279.
64. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S. Ct. 652
(1950).
65. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800, 103 S. Ct. 2706, 2712
(1983).
66. 1990 La. Acts No. 1009 (effective Jan. 1, 1991) abolished the concept of legal
separation from the law of marriage in Louisiana.
67. Magee v. Amiss, 502 So. 2d 568 (La. 1987). This decision has been criticized as
being in derogation of the Public Records Doctrine. See Mengis, The Public Records
Doctrine Revisited, A paper delivered to the Thirty-Seventh Annual Institute on Mineral
Law (March 29, 1990). But see Hargrave, Developments in the Law, 1985-1986, Louisiana
Constitutional Law, 47 La. L. Rev. 333 (1987).
68. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 582, 95 S. Ct. 729, 740 (1975).
69. Friendly, supra note 51, at 1281.
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by state action are entitled to be heard .... "o70 What is not necessarily
fundamental is the right to present those reasons orally." Adjudicative
facts are more likely to merit oral presentation than legislative facts.72
The individual is likely to make some valuable contribution to the
attainment of the truth if he is intricately involved in the occurrence
of the facts at issue (i.e., adjudicative facts). Such is not the case with
legislative facts concerning broader statistics or policy questions. In the
determination of legislative facts, written reasons will usually present
the individual's point of view adequately, while oral presentation would
function more as a delay than a fact-finding tool."1 Paillot involved
substantive factual findings, and any procedure would have been of
little value had the deprivee not been given a chance to orally present
her side of the story.74
Right to Call Witnesses
The right to call witnesses should generally be granted; however,
"the tribunal must be entitled reasonably to limit their number and the
scope of examination. '"7 Consideration should be given to factors such
as what contribution the witnesses will make to the ascertainment of
the truth, and at what point testimony becomes repetitive. In effect, a
common sense approach to limiting the number or examination of
witnesses should be applied. In the context of parole hearings, the United
States Supreme Court has suggested but specifically declined to hold
that reasons for limiting the right to call witnesses should be given.76
While an unsubstantiated denial may appear arbitrary, a statement of
valid reasons for denial would, in and of itself, contribute to a fairer
process. No valid reason appears for denying the individual in Paillot
the right to, within reason, call and examine witnesses.
70. In re Adoption of B.G.S., 556 So. 2d 545, 549 (1990).
71. Friendly, supra note 51, at 1281.
72. "Adjudicative facts usually answer the questions of who did what, where, when,
how, why, with what motive or intent; adjudicative facts are roughly the kind of facts
that go to a jury in a jury case. Legislative facts do not usually concern the immediate
parties but are the general facts which help the tribunal decide questions of law and
policy and discretion." 2 K. Davis, supra note 40, § 12:3, at 413. See also Fed. Code
Evid. art. 201, and La. Code Evid. arts. 201 & 202.
73. 2 K. Davis, supra note 40, § 12:3, at 413.
74. Paillot v. Wooton, 559 So. 2d 758, 761 (La. 1990), discussing Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975).
75. Friendly, supra note 51, at 1282.
76. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2979 (1974). See also
Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 496, 105 S. Ct. 2192, 2195 (1985). The risk of coercion
or retaliation is a major consideration in deciding whether to grant a right to an inmate
to call witnesses at his parole hearing.
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Right to Learn Adverse Evidence
The right to cross-examine witnesses is a method of learning of the
adverse evidence. A noted authority has advocated a very limited ex-
tension of the right to cross-examine witnesses, stating that "the main
effect of cross-examination is delay .. . . 77 This effect would be even
greater and would yield even less benefit in the case of cross-examination
of an expert.7 However, both the state and federal constitutions grant
a constitutional right of confrontation to criminal defendants.7 9 These
provisions, while they do not require this right to be extended outside
criminal cases, suggest that American notions of fairness hold the right
to confront one's adversaries to be an important one.10 The facts of
the Paillot case do not indicate that the government called any witnesses.
However, an informal questioning of the parish president concerning
the evidence relied upon probably would adequately have revealed the
basis of the government's actions. The brief inquiry would have served
to reveal to the plaintiff any credibility problems with the government's
information. When considered in the context of the Paillot case, the
right to conduct such an inquiry seemingly would not have caused
unbearable delay, and could have been a crucial credibility test.
Decision Based on Evidence Presented
The right to have the decision based on the evidence presented limits
the decision-maker's ability to base its decision on outside information.
Must the decision-maker base his decision only on the evidence presented
at the hearing, or may he also consider his own personal knowledge of
the matter? Under certain circumstances, even in a criminal trial, a
judge may take notice of certain undisputable facts upon his own motion,
and is required to take notice of certain laws."' However, notice of
material facts peculiar to the case, even in an informal hearing, is a
very different matter. The very reason the parties are present is to
determine facts. The possibility of abuses in taking notice of either
77. Friendly, supra note 51, at 1285.
78. Id.
79. La. Const. art. I., § 16:
"An accused is entitled to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against
him ...... I
U.S. Const. amend. VI:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him . .. ."
80. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 568-9, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2981 (1974), where
the court applied a balancing of competing interests in addressing the issue of granting
cross-examination rights to parole hearings.
81. La. Code Evid. arts. 201 & 202; Fed. Code Evid. art. 201.
[Vol. 51
NOTES
adjudicative or legislative facts can be lessened by the requirement of
written reasons for such notice. 82 Had notice of any material facts been
taken at the hearing in the Paillot case, written reasons would have
been necessary due to the parish president's involvement in the suspension
of the licenses. s3 In the Paillot situation, it is difficult to imagine relevant
facts worthy of consideration in the government's decision which would
not merit presentation at a hearing and at least some procedural testing.
Right to Counsel
While an individual's right to legal consultation before any govern-
mental hearing cannot and should not be denied, counsel's participation
at the hearing is not always a prerequisite to a fair adjudication of
factual issues. A lawyer's duty at trial is to protect his client, which
he might often do by avoidance, delay, or confusion in the presentation
of facts.Y To fully inject counsel into an administrative hearing converts
what is meant to be an alternative to trial into just that-a trial. Perhaps
a limited role for counsel, such as allowing advice to the citizen only
outside the presence of the tribunal or agency deciding the case, would
be more sensible in some cases. A more exploratory method by the
decision-maker, one allowing .him or her to actually question the wit-
nesses, would likely compensate for any loss in fact-finding effectiveness
resulting from counsel's absence. Ultimately, the disadvantages of al-
lowing counsel should be weighed against any contribution counsel may
make to the efficient adjudication of particular claims. While assistance
of counsel in Paillot was obviously necessary later, the governing body
probably would have taken the same action initially even had counsel
been present and argued on behalf of plaintiff. The plaintiff apparently
understood the action being taken against her, or at least she easily
could have had a hearing been allowed. Counsel was therefore not
needed for explanation of the case to the plaintiff. Allowing counsel
probably would have been only delay of the decision and a fee.
82. Friendly, supra note 51, at 1287.
83. See supra text accompanying note '63.
84. "Within the limits of professional propriety, causing delay and sowing confusion
not only are [a lawyer's) right but may be his duty." Friendly, supra note 51, at 1288.
Judge Friendly goes on to criticize the effectiveness of the adversarial process as a fact-
finding tool, opting for a more investigatory approach by the decision-maker. Id. at 1289,
1294-95.
But see, contra, 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 14:12, at 79 (1979), where
Professor Davis states, "Probably any person should have a due process right to be
represented by retained counsel in any administrative proceeding in absence of special
reason for denying it."
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Written Record
The primary use of an accurate record of proceedings is for review
on appeal. 5 Although a transcript is an effective tool in reviewing the
evidence, a proper statement of reasons for the decision describing the
evidence relied upon could render a transcript unnecessary. A simple,
sensible approach would be to require a statement of reasons and to
make a tape recording of the proceeding, to be transcribed only in the
event justice requires intervention into the decision-maker's findings. 86
This approach would avoid the cost of a written record, yet preserve
its benefit if review becomes necessary.
Statement of Reasons
A statement of reasons for the decision is of the utmost value and
little burden. Its primary function is preventing the necessity of other
expensive safeguards. For example, with a written statement of reasons
to serve as a syllabus of the proceeding, the need for a verbatim transcript
is greatly reduced. Furthermore, in many instances an even cursory
inspection of the written reasons could indicate to a reviewing court
that due process does not require further litigation.
The written statement of reasons can also function as the insemi-
nation of a process. The Paillot case is an excellent example: a statement
of reasons for the government's actions would have at least forced the
parish president to articulate the reasons for the action, and possibly
would have caused him to verify the facts behind those reasons. This
verification could have involved allowing the plaintiff to dispute the
facts, which would have amounted to an informal hearing.
Public Attendance
"Whatever other benefits the guarantee to an accused that his trial
be conducted in public may confer upon our society, the guarantee has
always been recognized as a safeguard against any attempt to employ
our courts as instruments of persecution.''8 While specific provisions
in the state and federal constitutions protect the right to public trial of
criminal matters, the due process clause controls the question of whether
there is a right to public attendance at administrative hearings."8 The
need for public attendance at initial hearings probably has an indirect
85. Friendly, supra note 51, at 1291-92.
86. Id.
87. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270, 68 S. Ct. 499, 506 (1948) (footnote omitted)
(emphasis added).
88. 3 K. Davis, supra note 84, § 14:12, at 59. However, La. Const. art. X does not
address procedures for governmental actions in the context of state civil service employees.
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relationship with whether a written record of proceedings, written reasons
for the decision, or judicial review (discussed below) also is required.
For example, an individual would be protected from arbitrary proceed-
ings behind closed doors if there is a proper written record and an
opportunity for appeal. s9 While public attendance is generally not con-
stitutionally required in administrative proceedings, 9° in most cases public
attendance creates no unreasonable hardships. 9' In particular cases, of
course, public attendance could create such a degree of disruption or
over-publication of personal matters so as to render its positive effects
insignificant. The interest at issue in Paillot involved a place of public
gathering, so there was probably no danger of over-publication of per-
sonal matters. Public attendance would seem to have been in order,
absent undue disruption.
Judicial Review
When considering the result of the initial government action involved
here, it becomes obvious that some kind of judicial review is necessary.
The consistency of analysis here will be of little actual consequence,
however, if courts do not exercise some restraint based on reasonable
confidence in various fact-finding agencies and officials. 92 Review should
be limited to whether due process was had and should not attempt to
analyze the resolution of factual issues in hindsight.
In sum, a balancing of the appropriate factors indicates due process
was not satisfied prior to the governmental deprivation in the Paillot
case. Using the above-noted balancing test, a reasonable conclusion is
that a prior hearing before an unbiased tribunal, notice of the allegations,
opportunity to present reasons why the action should not be taken, the
right to know the adverse evidence (cross-examination), the right to have
a decision based only on the evidence presented or reasons for taking
89. Professor Davis has stated that the exact opposite of this point actually exists:
"[T]he requirement varies with the degree of formality or lack of formality; the more
formal the oral process the greater the requirement of openness." 3 K. Davis, supra note
84, § 14:13, at 58. Professor Davis made this statement in interpreting the jurisprudence
on public attendance. For reasons stated in the text, the results of this "sparse" juris-
prudence seem to defy reason. Id. Those results, nevertheless, remain: the more formal
a hearing, the more likely public attendance will be allowed. This situation may result
more from the relatively small burden that public attendance usually entails upon the
tribunal than from any need to prevent arbitrariness. If public attendance does not involve
any additional burden on the government or any delay in the decision-maker's result,
what does the government have to lose by allowing the public to observe the proceedings?
90. Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1027, 1079-80 (1969).
91. For examples of those cases in which public attendance does create too much
adverse effect, see, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975) (school
suspensions); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S. Ct. 2963 (1974) (parole hearings).
92. Friendly, supra note 51, at 1295.
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notice of evidence not presented, an informal statement of reasons, and
public attendance would have satisfied due process requirements.
CONCLUSION
No single legal approach can solve all problems; close cases must
be litigated. This fact rings even more true when dealing with such a
nebulous concept as procedural due process. 93 But not all cases are close
ones, and the method described in this note provides a consistent and
methodical approach which will reduce litigation of those matters in-
volving clearly insufficient due process protections, such as the Paillot
scenario. Additionally, in many instances the informal proceedings dic-
tated by this method may produce more equitable results than more
formal adversarial ones.Y On the whole, if applied consistently by prac-
titioners and fact-finders, use of the method should result in just ad-
judication of matters potentially resulting in deprivations while
simultaneously reducing the volume of protracted litigation.
M. Shane Craighead
93. Such a practical approach to due process problems has even been criticized as
one which "tends to 'dwarf soft variables' and to ignore complexities and ambiguities."
J. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus For Administrative Adjudication
in Mathews v. Eildridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 28, 48 (1976).
94. Davis Supplement, supra note 6, § 13:1-1.
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